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IMPEACHMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY: 
THE CASE OF THE FIRST LADY 
Michael J. Broyde* and Robert A. Schapiro** 
The spouse of the President of the United States 
long has played an important role in the nation. The 
First Spouse's increasingly public involvement in pol-
icy matters, though, requires greater definition of the 
First Spouse's official status. Given the complex 
statutory framework regulating government opera-
tions, important legal questions may turn on whether 
the First Spouse is better characterized as an officer or 
as a mere unofficial adviser. Judges in three recent 
cases concluded that because of the First Spouse's sig-
nificant duties, the spouse should be deemed a gov-
ernment official. The judicial and scholarly treatments 
of the First Spouse's position, however, so far have 
given little consideration to a key aspect of official 
status. If First Spouses are officers, how may they be 
removed from office? Method of removal plays an 
important role in defining an office. While two of the 
traditional methods of removal- resignation and dis-
charge-seem available, this article discusses whether 
the First Spouse is subject to the third method of re-
moval, impeachment. The authors examine the formal 
and functional arguments as to the impeachability of 
the First Spouse. 
Impeachment talk is in the air. Even before Monica Lewin-
sky became a household name, discussion about impeaching 
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President Clinton abounded, from the pages of the Wall Street 
Journat to websites2 to the halls of Congress.3 Vice President 
Gore also has been the target of impeachment interest.4 Attor-
ney General Janet Reno's rejection of an independent counsel to 
investigate White House fundraising led to calls for her im-
peachment.5 Nor are impeachment targets solely in the Execu-
tive Branch. Critics of the federal judiciary have suggested im-
peaching certain "activist" judges." Given the pervasive partisan 
atmosphere in Washington and the widespread discussion of im-
peachment, one omission appears surprising. One of the most 
popular target of the Clinton Administration's critics has re-
mained generally immune from impeachment discussions. Not 
even Representative Bob Barr, the earliest congressional sup-
porter of impeachment efforts, has sought to impeach First Lady 
Hillary Rodham Clinton. While other slogans have moved from 
bumper stickers7 to policy proposals, so far it is only Clinton's 
husband (not Clinton's wife) who has inspired serious impeach-
ment discussion. Given the virulence of the criticism directed at 
I. See, e.g., Mark Helprin, Impeach, Wall St. J. A22 (Oct. 10, 1997); Terry East-
land, Starr's Exit Doesn't Preclude More Indictments, Wall St. J. A16 (Feb. 19, 1997) 
(predicting that President Clinton would have to worry about "Charybdis" of impeach-
ment for balance of his term). 
2. See, e.g., <http://www.impeachment.org>, <http://www.impeachclinton.org>. 
3. See, e.g., Bob Barr, High Crimes and Misdemeanors: The Clinton-Gore Scandals 
and the Question of Impeachment, 2 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 1, 20-51 (1997) (describing alle-
gations of impeachable offenses); Lawmaker Seeks Impeachment Inquiry, Chicago Trib-
une Sec. I, 10 (Mar. 15, 1997); Mark Sherman, Georgia Lawmaker Urges Impeachment 
Inquiry, Atlanta J. & Const. A6 (May 19, 1997); Will Congress Impeach Clinton?, Idaho 
Statesman 6A (Dec. 15, 1997) (noting that at least seventeen members of Congress sup-
ported initiating an impeachment probe against President Clinton); see also Danny 
Westneat, Why Pair Push Impeachment, Seattle Times A2 (Nov. 7, 1997) (discussing a 
resolution introduced by seventeen Republicans on Nov. 5, 1997 directing the House of 
Representatives to begin investigations into the possibility of impeaching the President). 
4. See, e.g., Barr, 2 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. at 29-39 (cited in note 3) (describing Rep-
resentative Barr's allegations against Vice President Gore); Impeach Clinton Now! lnter-
~·iew with Congressman Bob Barr, <http://www.impeachment.org/record/frame_barr 
.htm> (discussing Georgia Republican Bob Barr's letter of March 11, 1997 to House Ju-
diciary Chairman Henry Hyde requesting a full committee meeting regarding the possi-
bility of impeaching President Clinton and Vice President Gore). 
5. See William Safire, To Avoid Such a Disgrace, N.Y. Times§ 4 at 17 (Sept. 7, 
1997). Reno recently opened preliminary investigations to determine if an independent 
counsel should be appointed to investigate White House fundraising. See David 
Johnston, Reno Announces an Initial Inquiry into Clinton Ads, N.Y. Times AI (Sept. 9, 
1998) 
6. See, e.g., David Kairys, Clinton's Judicial Retreat; When Naming Judges, He Is 
Quick to Cave, Wash. Post Cl, C2 (Sept. 7, 1997) (noting House Majority Whip Tom 
Delay's proposal that "activist" judges be impeached). 
7. See Laura Ingraham, The Folly of Impeachment Chic; Invoking the '/' Word 
Only Hurts the GOP, Wash. Post Cl (Oct. 26, 1997) (reporting bumper sticker "Impeach 
Clinton And Her Husband, Too"). 
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Hillary Rodham ClintonR (along with suggestions of her possible 
indictmene), the absence of impeachment proposals likely does 
not reflect political restraint or lack of perceived grievance. 
Rather, one surmises that the limiting factor has been the as-
sumed lack of constitutional authority. The point of this essay is 
to investigate the underpinnings of that assumption. As we will 
explain, while it might be obvious that the impeachment of Hil-
lary Rodham Clinton would be substantively unjustified or po-
litically unwise, in light of recent court decisions it is less obvious 
that impeachment would be legally impossible. 
The Constitution provides that "The President, Vice Presi-
dent and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed 
from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, 
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." 10 In certain 
respects, the First Spouse'' clearly has some characteristics of an 
8. See, e.g., Richard Grenier, A Few Words of Advice for the First Lady, Wash. 
Times Al7 (Aug. 17, 1994) (criticizing Hillary Rodham Clinton); William Safire, Bliz-
zard of Lies, N.Y. Times 27 (Jan. 8, 1996) (calling Hillary Rodham Clinton "congenital 
liar"); see also Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Hating Hillary, New Yorker 116 (Feb. 26 & Mar. 
4, 1996) (discussing attacks on Hillary Rodham Clinton); Cheryl Lavin, Hillary Clinton: 
From First Lady to Second Fiddle, Chicago Tribune§ 13, I (Mar. 30, 1997) (same). 
9. See Prosecutor is Taped Regarding First Lady, N.Y. Times§ I, 19 (May 18, 
1997) ('"We certainly are investigating individuals, and those individuals-including Mrs. 
Clinton-could be indicted."') (quoting John Bates, deputy to Independent Counsel 
Kenneth Starr). Rumors continue to circulate about the possibility of Hillary Rodham 
Clinton's being indicted. Compare Jamie Detmer, Less Than Stellar Verdicts Forecast in 
Starr Inquiry, Insight Magazine 18 (Aug. 11, 1997) (sources predicting indictment un-
likely) and Robert D. Novak, To the Point, Commercial Appeal A7 (Aug. 12, 1997) 
(same) with John Crudele, Big Market Drop Had Reasons, Both Subtle and Silly, Austin-
American Statesman 24 (Aug. 23, 1997) (sources predicting indictments "probably in-
cluding Hillary Clinton"). The grand jury operating in Little Rock, Arkansas disbanded 
without indicting Hillary Rodham Clinton. See Peter Baker and Susan Schmidt, Presi-
dent is Denied Executh·e Privilege; Judge Says Aides Must Discuss Lewinsky Matter, 
Wash. Post AI, Al2 (May 6, 1998). A grand jury in Washington, D.C. continues to hear 
testimony, and the Independent Counsel could empanel a new grand jury in Little Rock. 
See id.; Peter Baker and Susan Schmidt, Prosecutors Question First Lady at Length; Starr 
Prepares to End Ark. Phase of Probe, Wash. Post AI (Apr. 26, 1998). 
An official subject to impeachment need not necessarily be impeached before being 
indicted. The question whether the President or Vice President may be indicted while 
still in office has produced scholarly controversy. See Eric M. Freedman, The Law as 
King and the King as Law: Is a President Immune from Criminal Prosecution Before Im-
peachment?, 20 Hastings Const. L.Q. 7, 9-12 & nn.5-12 (1992) (reviewing controversy). 
Recent historical precedent, however, supports the indictment of other officials. Secre-
tary of Labor Raymond J. Donovan was indicted while in office. See Donovan Quits and 
Prepares to Stand Trial, N.Y. Times§ 4, at I (Mar. 17, 1985). He subsequently was ac-
quitted of the charges. See Selwyn Raab, Donovan Cleared of Fraud Charges by Jury in 
Bronx, N.Y. Times AI (May 26, 1987). 
10. U.S. Const., Art. II,§ 4. 
11. The analysis in this essay applies to the spouse of the President, regardless of 
gender. We have, therefore, chosen to refer to that person as the "First Spouse," rather 
than "First Lady." "Spouse" does not correspond exactly to "Lady," but we rejected the 
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"officer." As spouse of the head of state, the First Spouse helps 
represent the nation in ceremonial and symbolic capacities. A 
First Spouse may also assist the Chief Executive in accomplish-
ing policy initiatives. By statute, First Spouses have a staff and 
budget to enable them to fulfill their tasks. 12 Indeed, Hillary 
Rodham Clinton has more senior aides than Vice President Al 
Gore. 13 The First Spouse's official role recently received judicial 
recognition. In Association of American Physicians and Sur-
geons v. Clinton/ 4 the applicability of the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act (FACAt turned on whether Hillary Rodham 
Clinton was a government officer. Because of F ACA's provi-
sions, it mattered whether Hillary Rodham Clinton was an offi-
cial or merely a (very good) Friend of Bill. The Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit resolved this question 
by holding that the First Spouse should be deemed a government 
officer. In the recent controversy concerning the assertion of at-
torney-client privilege for communications between Hillary 
Rodham Clinton and the White House Counsel, a district court 
agreed that the First S~ouse was a "de facto officer or employee 
of the White House." 6 Concurring with this recognition of the 
First Spouse's official status, the district court overseeing the 
grand jury's investigations into the Monica Lewinsky matter held 
that executive privilege extended to conversations including 
Hillary Rodham Clinton.17 
more closely corresponding generic titles of "First Human" (too anthropological) and 
.. First Person·· (too grammatical). 
12. 3 U.S.C. § 105(e) (1994). 
13. See Howard Fineman and Mark Miller, Hillary's Role, Newsweek 18 (Feb. 15, 
1993). 
14. 997 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
15. Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) (codified at 5 U.S.C. App. at 1175 
(1988)). 
16. Petition for certiorari 96-1783 at 71a, Office of the President v. Office of Inde-
pendent Counsel (reprinting In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum to the White House 
(E.D. Ark. Nov. 26, 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
117 S. Ct. 2482 (1997) ). Although holding that the White House could not claim attor-
ney-client privilege against the Independent Counsel, the Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit assumed for the sake of decision that Hillary Rodham Clinton enjoyed 
official status as a representative of the White House. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces 
Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 922 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2482 (1997). The dissenting 
judge explicitly relied on Association of American Physicians and Surgeons in finding 
that Hillary Rodham Clinton should be treated as an official adviser to the President. ld. 
at 933 (Kopf, J., dissenting). 
17. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d 21, 27-28 (D.D.C. 1998). Never-
theless, the district court compelled the testimony, finding that the need for the evidence 
overcame the privilege. Id. at 29. See also Jack Quinn and Jeff Connaughton, Watergate 
Was Then, This Is Now, Legal Times 23, 24 (Mar. 30, 1998) (defending assertion of ex-
ecutive privilege for conversations involving Hillary Rodham Clinton based on the First 
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If the First Spouse does occupy some kind of office, how 
does this position fit within our republican framework of gov-
ernment? The First Spouse attains office by means that are 
slightly unusual-by (usually pre-election) presidential designa-
tion18 not subject to Senate confirmation.19 But what about re-
moval from office? The manner of removal plays an important 
role in defining an official's status in the government.20 Presuma-
bly, as with other executive officials, resignation or discharge 
would be possible. The First Spouse could quit, by ceasing vol-
untarily from performing any ceremonial or administrative func-
tions. In the alternative, the President could effectively relieve 
the First Spouse of all authority, indeed even revoke the accou-
trements of office and banish the First Spouse from the White 
House and all official occasions. In short, the President could 
"fire" the First Spouse,21 as leaders in other countries have 
done. 22 But what if the First Spouse refused to resign, and the 
Spouse's official status). 
18. The designation may be post-election if the marriage takes place in office, as in 
the case of Grover Cleveland, or if the President designates someone other than a spouse 
because either the President remains unmarried or because the spouse is unable or un-
willing to perform the duties of First Spouse. See Carl David Wasserman, Note, Firing 
the First Lady: The Role and Accountability of the Presidential Spouse, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 
1215, 1243, n.117 (1995) (discussing historical examples of "surrogate" First Spouses); see 
also 3 U.S.C. § 105(e) (current statute setting forth President's authority to designate sur-
rogate to receive assistance usually provided to First Spouse). 
19. The statute allowing the President to designate a surrogate First Spouse does 
not require confirmation of the designee. See 3 U.S.C. § 105(e). 
20. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 731-32 (1986) (Comptroller General's 
manner of removal placed that office within legislative branch). 
21. See Katha Pollitt, The Male Media's Problem; First-Lady Bashing, 256 Nation 
657, 658 (1993). The supposed inability to fire Hillary Rodham Clinton is an issue fre-
quently raised by her opponents. See, e.g., Mickey Kaus, Thinking of Hillary, New Re-
public 6 (Feb. 15, 1993). Whatever one thinks of Hillary Rodham Clinton's power or the 
manner of its exercise, for the reasons discussed in the text arguments based on the al-
leged inability to dismiss her rest on false foundations. In addition, this essay discusses 
other means of ensuring the First Spouse's accountability. 
The current statutory framework presents some potential problems for a President 
seeking to replace a First Spouse. A statute authorizes assistance for the President's 
spouse or to a family member designated by the President "if the President does not have 
a spouse." 3 U.S.C. § 105(e). Arguably, short of death or divorce, this provision would 
limit the President's ability to supplant the current First Spouse. See Ass'n of American 
Physicians and Surgeons v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 905 (D.C. Cir. 1993); 48 Vand. L. Rev. 
at 1243-44 (cited in note 18). It is not clear, though, that this provision is meant to be 
restrictive, rather than merely enabling. Section 105(e) clarifies that the President may 
use government resources to assist the First Spouse or a surrogate if no spouse exists. 
The section does not necessarily prohibit assistance to someone else performing duties 
usually undertaken by the First Spouse. 
22. In Peru, President Alberto Fujimori relieved his wife of her duties as First Lady. 
See Calvin Sims, With Face-Off at a Fete, Peru's Election Race Begins, N.Y. Times A3 
(Aug. 29, 1994). Indeed, both President Fujimori and President Carlos Saul Menem of 
Argentina locked their wives out of the official residence and designated their daughters 
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President chose not to dismiss the First Spouse? Is the third op-
tion, removal by impeachment, available? 
In constitutional terms, whatever formal or informal duties 
the First Spouse undertakes, does the First Spouse constitute a 
"civil Officer" for Impeachment Clause purposes? Commenta-
tors have suggested that this term should receive a broad inter-
pretation,23 but the question is how broad; as usual, the text itself 
provides few answers. We will suggest two possible ways of ap-
proaching this question. One method notes the formal charac-
teristics of a constitutional "officer" and inquires whether the 
First Spouse fits the bill. Another, more functionalist, approach 
seeks to understand the purposes underlying the availability of 
impeachment of government officers and to inquire whether, 
given the First Spouse's duties, the availability of impeachment 
would serve those purposes.24 In setting the background for this 
exploration, we turn first to an outline of impeachment and its 
history, with special attention to the impeachment of subordi-
nate executive officials. 
I. IMPEACHMENT 
Rooted in old English precedents, impeachment under the 
Constitution requires that the House of Representatives indict 
to perform the symbolic functions of First Ladies. See Calvin Sims, £/ Presidente's New 
First Lady, N.Y. Times§ 4, at 5 (Apr. 23, 1995). A different situation arose in South Af-
rica when President Nelson Mandela expelled his wife, Winnie Mandela, from the cabi-
net on grounds of insubordination. See Bill Keller, Winnie Mandela out of Cabinet for 
Defying Presidential Orders, N.Y. Times AI (Mar. 28, 1995). After she challenged the 
legality of the dismissal, President Mandela revoked the discharge, then fired her again. 
Mandela Ousts His Wife from Cabinet Again, N.Y. Times§ I, at 2 (Apr. 15, 1995). The 
Mandela episode illustrates that presidential spouses clearly may be discharged if they 
hold standard governmental offices. The more difficult question this essay addresses 
concerns removal from the less well defined office of First Spouse. 
After a divorce from Winnie Mandela, President Mandela was sometimes accompa-
nied on official occasions by Graca Machel, who was referred to in press reports as "act-
ing first lady." See, e.g., Beatrice Khadige, Mandela Leaves on Tour of Southeast Asian 
"Success Stories," Agence France Press (Feb. 27, 1997). Mandela and Machel subse-
quently wed on Mandela's eightieth birthday. See Lynne Duke, Mandela, Longtime 
Companion Wed, Wash. Post A24 (July 19, 1998). 
23. See, e.g., Joseph Story, 1 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 
§ 792, at 550 (C.C. Little and J. Brown, 2d ed. 1851) ("All officers of the United States, 
therefore, who hold their appointments under the national government, whether their 
duties are executive or judicial, in the highest or in the lowest departments of the gov-
ernment, with the exception of officers in the army and navy, are properly civil officers 
within the meaning of the constitution, and liable to impeachment."). 
24. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Federal Impeachment Process 65 (Princeton U. 
Press, 1996) (describing "formalist" and "functionalist" approaches to impeachment 
analysis). 
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and then prosecute an accused official, and that the Senate sit as 
judge and jury to decide guilt or innocence. As employed in 
seventeenth-century England, the impeachment procedure 
brought to justice those who, because of their power or station, 
could not be reached by ordinary judicial mechanism; it was in 
this capacity that impeachment came to be used as one of the 
means of removing judges and royal officials from their posts. In 
this form, it was incorporated into the Constitution by the Foun-
ders. Because the removal of a high official from a post has his-
torically been an act of some political moment, surrounded by 
controversy, it requires the attention of both the House and the 
Senate in order to legitimate the resulting political upheaval. 
A. HISTORICAL PRACTICE 
In English practice, impeachment constituted a form of leg-
islative trial not limited to officeholders. The House of Com-
mons could impeach and the House of Lords try anyone, 
whether private citizen or government official; only members of 
the royal family were exempt.25 Criminal penalties, up to and in-
cluding death, could attach to the conviction.26 After independ-
ence, the new American states transformed the British practice, 
generally confining impeachment to officials and limiting pun-
ishment to loss of office.27 The framers relied on these state 
precedents in drafting the impeachment provisions of the Fed-
eral Constitution.28 In modifying the British practice, the state 
and federal constitutions remade impeachment in a more repub-
lican image, no longer representing an exercise of unbridled leg-
islative power, but instead realizing evolving notions of separa-
. f 29 tton o powers. 
The commitment to republican principles led to a narrowing 
of the domain of impeachment, but also to preserving the prac-
tice as an important constitutional element. In its British form, 
impeachment had served as a means for the legislature to protect 
itself against perceived royalist threats.30 The American states 
retained impeachment as a check against the potential corrup-
25. Id. at 10; C.S. Potts, Impeachment as a Remedy, 12 St. Louis L. Rev. 15, 16 
(1927) . 
26. See Peter Charles Hoffer and N.E.H. Hull, Impeachment in America, /635-1805 
at 3 (Yale U. Press, 1984). 
27. See id. at 67. 
28. See id. at 68. 
29. See id. at 76-77. 
30. See id. at 4-5, 68. 
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tion of public officials. In republics, as well as in monarchies, of-
ficers could abuse the public trust. The framers of state constitu-
tions had doubts about relying solely on electoral protections, 
particularly because such democratic checks did not provide an 
adequate safeguard for curbing abuses between elections.31 
While state constitutions limited impeachments to government 
officials, they generally allowed impeachment of any official.32 
This model of impeachment conformed to republican notions of 
limited and separated powers: Governors could appoint officials, 
and legislatures could remove them. The division of authority 
protected against tyranny.33 In addition to providing a means of 
dislodging particular, corrupt officials, impeachment also had a 
larger symbolic value, representing a public commitment to hon-
est government.34 After debating various possible impeachment 
arrangements, the delegates at the Constitutional Convention 
followed state practice and adopted language allowing the im-
peachment of all government officers.35 
The constitutional text, along with contemporaneous state 
practice, demonstrates a belief in the need for impeachment to 
be available as an antidote to official corruption at all levels. 
Elections might not act soon enough to remove the canker from 
the body politic. Further, mere removal from office did not con-
stitute a sufficient punishment for violating the public trust. Im-
peachment could include disqualification from future office, for-
ever marking the offender with a badge of dishonor and 
banishing the convict from the republican community.36 Im-
peachment thereby offered a sanction categorically greater than 
the mere loss of office that would follow from resignation or 
dismissal. Impeachment had an important place in the constitu-
tional framework of the new states and the new nation. 
31. See id. at 61-63. 
32. See id. at 68-77. 
33. See id. at 76, 97. 
34. See id. at 78. 
35. See U.S. Const., Art. II, § 4 ("The President, Vice President and all civil Offi-
cers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Con-
viction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."); see also Joseph 
Story, 1 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States at 550 (cited in note 23) 
("All officers of the United States, therefore, who hold their appointments under the na-
tional government, whether their duties are executive or judicial, in the highest or in the 
lowest departments of government, with the exception of officers in the army and navy, 
are properly civil officers within the meaning of the constitution, and liable to impeach-
ment."). 
36. See U.S. Const., Art. I,§ 3, cl. 7. 
1998] IMPEACHMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY 487 
B. IMPEACHMENT OF SUBORDINATE OFFICERS 
Under the United States Constitution, Cabinet members are 
executive officials responsible to the President. Because of the 
President's democratic accountability, it would not necessarily 
have been undemocratic to confer on the President the sole 
authority to remove subordinate executive officials. However, 
the framers chose otherwise. The President might not dismiss a 
corrupt official. Impeaching the President in such circumstances 
would likely represent an impractical and disproportionate re-
sponse. Moreover, the President's refusing to remove a guilty 
official might not, in itself, constitute an impeachable offense 
subjecting the President to removal.37 As Raoul Berger has ex-
plained, the framers were "fearful of the ministers and favorites 
whom Kings had refused to remove, and they dwelt repeatedly 
on the need of power to oust corrupt or oppressive ministers 
whom the President might seek to shelter. "38 
The impeachment authority stands in contrast to Congress's 
narrower involvement in the appointments process. Congress 
does not select officers; its role is confined to senatorial confir-
mation of presidential nominees.39 The constitutional lines are 
thus sharply drawn: with regard to filling offices, Congress's role 
extends no further than "advice and consent";40 in cases of offi-
cial misconduct, Congress can act alone in impeaching and re-
moving all officers.41 Congress has a limited role in saying 
"hello," but it can always say "goodbye. "42 That removal power 
37. See John R. Labovitz, Presidential impeachment 170-72 (Yale U. Press, 1978) 
(discussing when misconduct by subordinates may be attributed to President); Charles L. 
Black, Jr., impeachment: A Handbook 46-47 (Yale U. Press, 1974) (same). 
38. Raoul Berger, Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems 101 (Harvard U. 
Press, 1973) (footnote omitted). 
39. The Constitution confers on the President the authority to nominate all "Offi-
cers of the United States," with the exception of "inferior" officers, whose appointment 
Congress may vest in the "Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." U.S. Const., 
Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Congress may not vest the appointment power in itself. See Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,127-36 (1976) (per curiam). 
40. With regard to "inferior Officers," Congress might not even have a confirming 
role, if it chooses to vest appointment authority in the President alone, in courts of law, 
or in heads of departments. See U.S. Const., Art. II,§ 2, cl. 2. 
41. Congress's impeachment authority is essentially unreviewable. The President 
cannot grant a pardon in cases of impeachment, see U.S. Const., Art. II, § 2, and the 
courts will apparently treat impeachment issues as nonjusticiable, see Nixon v. United 
States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993). 
42. Impeachment is generally the exclusive means for Congress to remove a par-
ticular official. Once it has approved a nominee, Congress cannot revoke the confirma-
tion. See United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6, 48-49 (1932). Through its appropriation 
authority, Congress could abolish an office. However, constitutional questions might 
arise if Congress used this power to circumvent impeachment. See Constitutionality of 
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is not unlimited. It is carefully cabined both proceduralll3 and 
substantively.44 Nevertheless, the impeachment power remains a 
crucial aspect of our system of separated powers. Separation of 
powers may require that the subordinate executive officials be 
answerable in the first instance to the President, not to Congress. 
If the Executive abuses its power, however, Congress retains the 
right to remove executive officials, including both the Chief Ex-
ecutive and subordinate officers. Separation of powers allows 
energetic government, but it also shields us against tyranny. Im-
peachment is an important part of avoiding tyranny.4' 
C. IMPEACHMENT PRECEDENTS 
Federal judges, who enjoy life tenure and guaranteed sala-
ries, have incentives not to resign, but to instead force Congress 
to resort to impeachment. By contrast, executive officers who 
commit impeachable offenses almost inevitably resign or are 
dismissed; they are usually not provided the luxury of an im-
peachment trial.46 Indeed, impeachment of a subordinate execu-
tive officer has occurred only once,47 as political pressure by 
members of Congress generally has proved sufficient to precipi-
tate resignation or dismissal. 
In the nation's history, there have been fifteen impeach-
ments of federal officials: a President, a Cabinet member, a Su-
preme Court Justice, a Senator, a court of appeals judge and ten 
district court judges.48 Thirteen of these impeachments have 
Proposed Legislation Requiring Renomination and Reconfirmation of Executive Branch 
Officers upon the Expiration of a Presidential Term, 11 United States Dept. of Justice 
Office of Legal Counsel, 25, 26 (1987); Richard A. Cirillo, Comment, Abolition of Fed-
eral Offices as an Infringement on the President's Power to Remove Federal Executive Of-
ficers: A Reassessment of Constitutional Doctrines, 42 Fordham L. Rev. 562 (1974). An 
example of such constitutionally questionable conduct would be removing a particular 
official by abolishing the office and simultaneously re-establishing it as a now vacant po-
sition. 
43. See, e.g., U.S. Const., Art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (requiring two thirds vote of Senate to 
impeach and that Senate be sitting "on oath or affirmation"). 
44. See U.S. Const., Art. II, § 4 (limiting impeachable offenses to "Treason, Brib-
ery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors"). 
45. See Peter M. Shane, Presidents, Pardons, and Prosecutors: Legal Accountability 
and The Separation of Powers, 11 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 361,382-83 (1993) (impeachment 
creates "important institutional check upon official corruption"). 
46. Indeed, one of us has argued that it is in itself scandalous that federal judges are 
provided that luxury when a crime has been committed. See Michael J. Broyde, Expe-
diting Impeachment: Removing Article III Federal Judges After Criminal Conviction, 17 
Harv.J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 157, 168-69 (1994). 
47. See notes 49-56 and accompanying text (discussing impeachment of William W. 
Belknap). 
48. For two excellent and comprehensive examinations of the history of impeach-
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been followed by trial in the Senate, resulting in seven convic-
tions and removals from office. However, only two members of 
the executive branch have been impeached-President Andrew 
Johnson and William W. Belknap, President Grant's Secretary 
of War. Belknap's case represents the sole instance of the im-
peachment of a subordinate executive official. 
A House Ways and Means Committee investigation re-
vealed that Belknap had accepted monel' in exchange for an ap-
pointment to an Army post tradership.4 The Committee report 
recommended that Belknap be impeached immediately, and he 
was. 50 Belknap resigned on the same day the House report was 
released.51 The House Managers nevertheless pressed on with 
Belknap's impeachment trial. On the floor of the Senate, those 
advocating that the trial proceed asserted that officials who 
abused the public trust deserved the punishment of disqualifica-
tion from future office. Further, they argued, impeachment 
branded the wrongdoers with a permanent mark of shame and 
provided an important deterrent to others who might yield to the 
temptations of tyranny or corruption.52 
ment of American judges, see Eleanore Bushnell, Crimes, Follies, Misfortunes: The Fed-
era/Impeachment Trials (U. of Illinois Press, I Y92) and Mary L. Volcansek, Judicia/Im-
peachment: None Called for Justice (U. of Illinois Press, I YY3). 
4Y. See John D. Feerick, Impeaching Federal Judges: A Study of the Constitutional 
Provisions, 3Y Fordham L. Rev. I, 36-37 (I Y70). 
50. !d. at 36. 
51. !d. 
52. J. Proctor Knott, Chair of the House Judiciary Committee and one of the Man-
agers of the impeachment stated: 
Was the only purpose of this disqualification simply to preserve the Govern-
ment from the danger to be apprehended from the single convicted criminal? 
Very far from it, sir! That in reality constituted but a very small part of the de-
sign. The great object, after all, was that his infamy might be rendered con-
spicuous, historic, eternal, in order to prevent the occurrence of like offenses in 
the future. The purpose was not simply to harass, to persecute, to wantonly de-
grade, or to take vengeance upon a single individual; but it was that other offi-
cials through all time might profit by his punishment, might be warned by his 
political ostracism, by the everlasting stigma fixed upon his name by the most 
august tribunal on earth, to avoid the dangers upon which he wrecked, and 
withstand the temptations under which he fell; to teach them that if they should 
fall under like temptations they will fall, like Lucifer, never to rise again. 
Proceedings of the Senate Sitting for the Trial of William W. Belknap 203 (Government 
Printing Office, 1876) (statement of Manager Knott) (May 8, 1876). Senator Maxey of 
Texas voiced similar sentiments: 
We know not what is the unpardonable sin which excludes its perpetrator from 
all hope of entering the portals of heaven, but this we do know, that a man who 
stands convicted of high crimes and misdemeanors committed while in office, 
and is sentenced by the court of impeachment to perpetual disqualification, is 
held by public opinion to be a living, moving infamy, a moral leper, shunned by 
h1s fellow-man and without hope of pardon this side the grave. 
And this supreme punishment is, in my judgment, inflicted not only to get 
rid of a bad man in office, not only to prevent that man ever being restored to 
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When the House Managers brought the case to the bar of 
the Senate, Belknap challenged the Senate's jurisdiction. He 
claimed that because of his resignation, he was no longer a civil 
officer at the time the charges were brought against him.53 The 
Senate as a body rejected that defense by a vote of 37 to 29.54 
The votes on the articles of impeachment achieved similar ma-
jorities,55 but fell short of the two thirds necessary for conviction. 
Of the 25 Senators who voted for acquittal, 22 rested their votes 
on the view that Belknap's resignation deprived the Senate of 
jurisdiction.56 The Belknap episode left an ambiguous precedent 
on the impeachability of former officials. A majority of the Sen-
ate supported the impeachability of former officials, but the ar-
gument against Senate jurisdiction resulted in Belknap's acquit-
tal.57 Scholars today generally agree that in principle former 
officials are subject to impeachment.58 Clearly, impeachment re-
mains a possibility for current executive officers.59 
II. ANALYZING THE LEGAL POSITION OF THE FIRST 
SPOUSE 
The constitutional question whether the First Spouse is 
subj_ect to impeachment turns on the definition of "civil Officer" 
office, but chiefly, by fearful example, to teach all men that American institu-
tions and the perpetuation of free government, of the people, by the people, 
and for the people, demand purity in office. 
!d. (opinion of Senator Maxey) (May 17, 1876). 
53. See Feerick, 39 Fordham L. Rev. at 37 (cited in note 49). 
54. Asher C. Hinds, 3 Precedents of the House of Representatives of the United 
States § 2459 at 934; Proceedings of the Senate Sitting for the Trial of William W. Belknap 
at 239 (1876) (cited in note 52). 
55. Hinds,§ 2647 at 945 (cited in note 54). 
56. See Irving Brant, Impeachment Trials and Errors 160 (Alfred A. Knopf, 1972). 
Because not all Senators voted on all articles, the votes for conviction ranged from 35 to 
37, while the same 25 Senators voted for acquittal on each article. See Proceedings of the 
Senate Sitting for the Trial of William W. Belknap at 1165-66 (1876) (cited in note 52). 
57. See Gerhardt, The Federal Impeachment Process at 52 (cited in note 24). 
58. See id. at 79 (citing "surprising consensus among commentators that resignation 
does not necessarily preclude impeachment and disqualification"); Potts, 12 St. Louis L. 
Rev. at 23 (cited in note 25); Ronald D. Rotunda, An Essay on the Constitutional Pa-
rameters of Federal Impeachment, 76 Ky. L.J. 707,716-17 (1987/1988). 
59. Although the Belknap episode took place during a time when the Tenure of 
Office Act purported to limit presidential removal of executive officials, the precedent of 
impeaching subordinate officials clearly is not so limited. Belknap's impeachment had 
nothing to do with any potential difficulties in removing him by other means. After all, 
he had resigned before the House vote on impeachment. More generally, the language 
allowing the impeachment of all officers was placed in the Constitution at a time when it 
was generally believed that the President could remove executive officials. See Jack N. 
Rakove, Original Meanings 347-50 (Alfred A. Knopf, 1996). This prerogative was subse-
quently affirmed in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
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in the Impeachment Clause. Questions of "officer" status gen-
erally arise when the method of selecting a particular official ar-
guably violates the standards set out in the Appointments 
Clause.60 Under that clause, an "officer" can be appointed only 
by the President, the "Heads of Departments," or the "Courts of 
Law." The definition of an "officer" in the Appointments 
Clause context illuminates the scope of the "officers" subject to 
impeachment. Though the equation is not beyond dispute, it 
would make textual sense to give the word the same meaning in 
the two clauses, and it would make sense from a structural per-
spective that the same accountability concerns underlying im-
peachability also would require adherence to the strict proce-
dural requirements of the Appointments Clause.61 In discussing 
60. The Appointments Clause states: 
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges 
of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Ap-
pointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be estab-
lished by Law; but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such in-
ferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of 
Law, or in the Heads of Departments. 
U.S. Const., Art. II,§ 2, cl. 2. 
61. Other commentators have suggested that "officers" should have the same 
meaning in both the Appointments Clause and the Impeachment Clause. See, e.g., 
Communications Satellite Corporation, 42 U.S. Op. Att'y Gen. 165, 172 (1962) (asserting 
that status as "officer" under Appointments Clause would render official subject to im-
peachment); A. Michael Froomkin, Reinventing the Go~·ernment Corporation, 1995 U. Ill. 
L. Rev. 543, 594-95 (discussing impeccability of directors of federal government corpora-
tions); cf. Gerhardt, The Federal Impeachment Process at 75-77 (cited in note 24) (sug-
gesting that "Officers of the United States," though not necessarily inferior officers, are 
subject to impeachment). An argument could be made, though, that the set of "civil Offi-
cers" liable to impeachment might be construed more broadly than the category of "offi-
cers" covered by the Appointments Clause. Broad construction of the impeachment 
power enhances democratic control over all those performing government duties, what-
ever their technical denomination. See Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461,468 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 
1978) (raising possibility in dicta that "de facto civil officers" might be subject to im-
peachment). The extraordinary remedy of impeachment poses little danger of congres-
sional micromanagement of executive personnel. On the other hand, the designation as 
an "officer" for Appointments Clause purposes means that Congress may require Senate 
confirmation (for "inferior" officers) or that Senate confirmation is a constitutional ne-
cessity (for other officers). In either case, the President's control over the appointment 
process may be constrained. Accordingly, some commentators have suggested that the 
Appointments Clause be construed narrowly as not covering personal presidential aides, 
such as "Assistants to the President." The purpose of such a narrow construction would 
be to prevent Congress from imposing a requirement of Senate confirmation that would 
restrict the President's flexibility in choosing key aides. See Cirillo, 42 Fordham L. Rev. 
at 595 (cited in note 42); see also Douglas S. Onley, Note, Treading on Sacred Ground: 
Congress's Power to Subject White House Advisers to Senate Confirmation, 37 Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. 1183, 1202 (1996) (arguing that separation of powers principles prohibit 
Congress from setting conditions on removal of personal presidential assistants, even if 
assistants are "inferior officers"). These commentators limit their analysis to the Ap-
pointments Clause context and do not question the breadth of Congress's impeachment 
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which positions are subject to the constraints of the Appoint-
ments Clause, the Supreme Court has stated that "any appointee 
exercising significant authoritr pursuant to the laws of the 
United States" is an "officer."6 Excluded from this definition-
and the accompanying constitutional strictures- are certain 
"lesser functionaries,"63 particularly those whose positions lack 
"tenure, duration, continuing emolument, or continuous du-
ties."64 Though unremunerated,65 the position of First Spouse 
does appear to have tenure, duration, and continuous duties. 
The key, and difficult, question is whether the First Spouse exer-
cises significant governmental authority. In a formal sense, no 
action that the First Spouse takes has, by itself, binding legal 
consequences. On the other hand, whatever may have been the 
case in the past, contemporary First Spouses function continu-
ously in important public roles. Their influence extends much 
more widely than the "lesser functionaries" who constitute mere 
employees, rather than officers. Though the fit is not perfect, 
authority. Holding an official liable to impeachment, with its procedural and substantive 
safeguards, would constitute a much lower level of intrusion into executive discretion 
than would requiring an official to undergo Senate confirmation. See footnotes 43-44 
and accompanying text (describing impeachment safeguards). Little legal authority cur-
rently exists to define the status of personal presidential assistants. Though we focus 
more narrowly on the special issues posed by the role of the First Spouse, the account-
ability concerns discussed in this essay certainly suggest that officials in the Office of the 
President should be subject to impeachment. 
62. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 ( 1976 ). 
63. Id. at 126 n.162. 
64. Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310, 327 (1890) (merchant appraiser not "offi-
cer"); see also United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 511 (1879) (surgeon appointed by 
Commissioner of Pensions not an "officer"); United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. 385, 393 
(1867); Proposed Commission on Deregulation of International Ocean Shipping, 7 U.S. 
Op. Off. Legal Counsel202, 202-03 (1983) (members of commission with purely advisory 
functions need not be "officers"); The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the 
President and Congress, United States Dept. of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, (prelimi-
nary print May 7, 1996) (available on WESTLAW 1996 WL 876050) (discussing distinc-
tion between "officers" and "employees"). 
In applying the constitutional standard, the Attorney General has opined that an 
"officer" also must fulfill primarily public, rather than private functions. Communica-
tions Satellite Corporation, 42 U.S. Op. Att'y Gen. 165, 169 (1962) (incorporator and di-
rector of Communications Satellite Corporation not "officer" because tasks temporary 
and more private than public). 
65. Although the Supreme Court does mention emolument as one factor in the test 
of a constitutional "officer," its significance is not entirely clear. The Court distinguishes 
constitutional "officers" from mere "employees." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126 n.l62. How-
ever, as Judge Buckley of the Court of Appeals noted, in general," An ·unpaid employee' 
is an oxymoron, although an 'unpaid officer' is not." Ass'n of American Physicians and 
Surgeons v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 920 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Buckley, 1., concurring in the 
judgment). Thus, perhaps paradoxically, while mere occasional compensation might 
suggest a person is an "employee" rather than an "officer," the complete absence of 
payment might not. The Constitution, itself, recognizes the possibility of offices of 
"Honor" or "Trust," as well as offices of "Profit." See U.S. Canst., Art. I,§ 3, cl. 7. 
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the First Spouse also could find a place in the Appointments 
Clause framework as an "inferior officer" whose appointment 
Congress has vested in the President alone. Ultimately, the 
question of officer status depends on whether one emphasizes 
the formal or the functional characteristics of the First Spouse's 
office. 
In addressing separation of powers issues, the Supreme 
Court has employed both formal and functional approaches. 66 
The Court sometimes insists on clearly defining the location of 
an official, based on the formal characteristics of the office, then 
zealously scrutinizing the officer's duties to ensure that they do 
not cross into territory reserved for other branches of govern-
ment."7 In other cases, the Court instead focuses on the practical 
operation of an office and whether the particular duties, how-
ever characterized, represent a threat to the principles underly-
ing the constitutional division of governmental authority."R The 
outcome of a specific case may well turn on which framework 
the Court chooses to apply. Similarly, the legal definition of the 
First Spouse's position largely depends on whether one adopts a 
formal or a functional perspective, that is, whether one focuses 
on the statutory or constitutional definition of an officer or in-
stead examines how the First Spouse functions in the Admini-
stration and interacts with government officials. Though the 
evidence is mixed, formal arguments tend to suggest that the 
First Spouse is not a "civil Officer." The functional arguments, 
on the other hand, generally support the characterization of the 
First Spouse as a "civil Officer" for purposes of the Impeach-
ment Clause. 
A. FORMALARGUMENTS 
The formal arguments against the First Spouse's being con-
66. See, e.g., Laura S. Fitzgerald, Cadenced Power: The Kinetic Constitution, 46 
Duke L.J. 679, 689-716 (1997); Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to 
Separation-of-Powers Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 488 
(1987); Keith Werhan, Normalizing the Separation of Powers, 70 Tul. L. Rev. 2681 
(1996). 
67. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 734 (1986) (holding Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings Act unconstitutional based on characteristics of office of Comptroller General); 
Strauss, 72 Cornell L. Rev. at 496-502 (cited in note 66) (discussing formalism in Bow-
sher). 
68. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (19&'l) (upholding Independent 
Counsel statute as not causing impermissible interference with executive duties); Mis-
tretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding sentencing scheme involving 
United States Sentencing Commission); Fitzgerald, 46 Duke L.J. at 702-03 (cited in note 
66) (discussing functionalism in Morrison). 
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sidered an officer are substantial. The First Spouse is not elected 
or formally appointed. Neither the Constitution nor any statute 
sets out duties for the First Spouse. The First Spouse does not 
take the oath constitutionally required for officers of the United 
States. The First Spouse receives no salary, and the Anti-
Nepotism Act suggests that the First Spouse cannot be employed 
in the White House."9 The senior officials in the Office of the 
First Lady are technically Assistants to the President, appointed 
by the President.70 
Arguments for the First Spouse's official position do find 
support in 3 U.S.C. § 105(e), a provision authorizing assistance 
to the President's spouse when the spouse is helping the Presi-
dent to discharge official duties.71 This statute effectively recog-
nizes the important role of the First Spouse and provides public 
support for the spouse's activities in assisting the President. The 
statute also authorizes an unmarried President to designate an-
other family member to act as a surrogate First Spouse. The al-
lowance of a substitute demonstrates that the First Spouse is 
more than just the spouse of the President, for the position exists 
in some form even in the absence of a spouse.72 Even § 105( e), 
however, shows the difficulty in assimilating the First Spouse's 
role to that of a traditional officer. The President has little dis-
cretion in choosing who will receive the designated assistance. 
The President's spouse automatically assumes that role. Only if 
the President has no spouse can the President designate who will 
be entitled to government assistance, and even then, the statute 
specifies that the person be a "member of the President's fam-
ily."73 Moreover, the statute does not even directly authorize the 
First Spouse to assist the President. Rather, the statute provides 
69. See 5 U.S.C. § 3110(a),(b) (1994). 
70. See Wasserman, 48 Vand. L. Rev. at 1247 nn.136-37 (cited in note 18) (citing 
Federal Yellow Book,§ I at l-7, I-13 (Leadership Directories, Winter 1995)). 
71. 3 U.S.C. § 105(e) provides: 
Assistance and services authorized pursuant to this section to the President are 
authorized to be provided to the spouse of the President in connection with as-
sistance provided by such spouse to the President in the discharge of the Presi-
dent's duties and responsibilities. If the President does not have a spouse, such 
assistance and services may be provided for such purposes to a member of the 
President's family whom the President designates. 
72. The possibility of the President's choosing a substitute presents another line of 
reasoning supporting the First Spouse's official position. Method of selection provides a 
strong indication of status. Because the surrogate is formally designated by the Presi-
dent, pursuant to statutory authority, the surrogate has a powerful claim to official status. 
If the surrogate First Spouse is an officer, moreover, that would suggest that a genuine 
First Spouse also would have officer status. 
73. 3 U.S.C. § 105(e). 
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that federal employees may assist the First Spouse.74 
B. FUNCTIONAL ARGUMENTS 
The strongest arguments for the First Spouse's official status 
are functional, recognizing the reality of the First Spouse's im-
portant role. The First Spouse undertakes duties corresponding 
to the dual role of the American Presidency. As head of state, 
the President embodies the nation and represents it in formal 
and symbolic capacities. In performing their extensive social and 
ceremonial functions, heads of state require assistants and some-
times surrogates. Such duties often devolve upon relatives of the 
Head of State, and the First Spouse traditionally has performed 
these functions in the United States.75 The significant position of 
the spouse of the head of state has long been recognized in the 
United States, and the title "First Lady"7" evidences the per-
ceived importance of this role.77 Under international law, as well, 
the spouse of the head of state enjoys a special status.78 As head 
of government, the President formulates and executes particular 
partisan policies. Generally enjoying unlimited access to the 
President and serving as the President's most trusted adviser, the 
spouse may work with the Chief Executive in designing and im-
74. See Ass'n of American Physicians v. Clinton, 997 F.2d X98, 920 (D.C. Cir. 1993) 
(Buckley, J., concurring in the judgment). 
75. See Myra G. Gutin, The President's Partner 2 (Greenwood Press, 1989). 
76. The title "First Lady" apparently dates from the Civil War era. A newspaper 
column in 1870 used the term to refer to President Grant's wife Julia. Earlier, Jefferson 
Davis's wife, Varina, was reportedly called the "first lady of the Confederacy." Betty 
Boyd Caroli, First Ladies xv (Oxford U. Press, 1995). 
77. Recent controversy in England confirms the powerful symbolism of the title. 
An opposition Member of Parliament accused Prime Minister Tony Blair of allowing his 
wife to be called "First Lady." Blair angrily denied the charge. The implication of the 
exchange was that in England, only the Queen should be referred to as "First Lady." See 
James Landale, Labour Rejects 'First Lady' Charge, Times (London) 11 (June 5, 1997); 
see also Piers Morgan, Tony Blair: His First Interview as Prime Minister, Mirror (Lon-
don) 7 (July 19, 1997) (quoting Prime Minister Blair's rejecting ''First Lady" as title for 
his wife). 
Similarly, the controversy in Israel concerning Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu's attempts to transform his office into an "American-style" presidency has 
focused in part on Netanyahu's wife and her displacement of President Ezer Weizman's 
wife from the role of "First Lady." See Susan Hattis Rolef, Lock, Stock and Barrel, Jeru-
salem Post 6 (July 8, 19%); see also Anton La Giardia, Israel's First Lady, Daily Tele-
graph 30 (Mar. 29, 1997) (discussing Sara Netanyahu's embracing term "first lady," de-
spite criticism). 
78. See, e.g., Kline v. Kaneko, 535 N.Y.S.2d 303, 305 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (granting 
immunity at behest of State Department to wife of Mexican President) affd sub. nom. 
Kline v. Cordero De La Madrid, 546 N.Y.S.2d 506 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); Restatement 
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 464 cmt. a & reporters' note 14 (explaining that im-
munity extends to heads of state and spouses). 
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plementing the Administration's political agenda.79 
First Spouses have always wielded a great deal of power. 
They have often influenced the President's appointments of 
cabinet and diplomatic officials, and many have undertaken 
other tasks as well. Abigail Adams ventured into political dis-
putes on her husband's behalf.80 Sarah Polk edited her husband's 
speeches.81 Eleanor Roosevelt influenced her husband's poli-
cies,82 performed a variety of advisory tasks, and served in the 
Office of Civilian Defense.83 Betty Ford carried weight with her 
husband on various topics includinJ the controversial pardon of 
former President Richard Nixon. Rosalynn Carter sat in on 
cabinet meetings85 and conducted substantive talks with Latin 
American officials.8" The First Spouse who undoubtedly exer-
cised the most power was Edith Wilson. After Woodrow Wilson 
suffered a debilitating stroke, she became his surrogate, deter-
mining whom and what he saw.87 Hillary Rodham Clinton's ac-
tivities represent a break with the past chiefly in that she has as-
sumed a more formal, and thus more public, policy making role, 
most notably heading the Task Force for National Health Care 
Reform.88 
79. For a discussion of the implications for the President's spouse of the dual presi-
dential roles of head of state and head of government, see Caroli, First Ladies at xviii 
(cited in note 76); Anne Morris, Professor's Fascination with Presidential Wives Leads to 
Reference Book, Austin American-Statesman G1 (Mar. 10, 1996) (quoting Professor 
Lewis Gould). 
80. See Paul F. Boller, Jr., Presidential Wives 18-19 (Oxford U. Press, 1988); Ed-
wards Park, Around the Mall and Beyond, Smithsonian 22, 23 (Mar. 1992). 
81. See Park, Smithsonian at 24 (cited in note 80). 
82. See Boller, Presidential Wi~·es at 297 (cited in note 80); Lewis L. Gould, First 
Ladies, Am. Scholar 528,532 (Autumn 1986). 
83. See Gil Troy, Affairs of State: The Rise and Rejection of the Presidential Couple 
Since World War II at 7 (The Free Press, 1997). 
84. See Caroli, First Ladies at xviii (cited in note 76). 
85. See Boller, Presidential Wives at 442 (cited in note 80); Park, Smithsonian at 25 
(cited in note 80). 
86. See Caroli, First Ladies at xix (cited in note 76). 
87. See Boller, Presidential Wives at 227 (cited in note 80); Park, Smithsonian at 22 
(cited in note 80); Karl E. Meyer, The President's Other Running Mate, N.Y. Times A22 
(Jan. 27, 1993). 
88. As one commentator has argued: 
Hillary Rodham Clinton had broken new ground as First Lady-not because 
she usurped power but because she admitted to using the power that the presi-
dential system had always permitted spouses. The candor-not the power-was 
new. . . . This was no new game in which she had altered the rules. She [had 
merely taken] up the cards that any First Lady was dealt. Her novelty lay in the 
fact that ... she played them with competence and confidence. 
Caroli, First Ladies at 307-08 (cited in note 76); see also Susan Faludi, The Power Laugh, 
N.Y. Times§ 4, at 13 (Dec. 20, 1992) (Hillary Rodham Clinton differs with her predeces-
sors not in exercising power, but in obviously enjoying her independent role); Wasser-
man, 48 Vand. L. Rev. at 1229 (cited in note 18) ("Mrs. Clinton is not the first First Lady 
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Of course, whether or not a government officer, the First 
Spouse is clearly one of a number of unelected assistants. Presi-
dents long have had "kitchen cabinets" of unofficial advisers.89 
The question is whether the nature and extent of the First 
Spouse's duties have taken the spouse out of the kitchen.90 Re-
lying on the functional characteristics of the position, the courts 
in American Physicians and two subsequent cases came to the 
conclusion that the First Spouse was an official.91 
to take an active political role-or to face criticism for doing so."); Transcript #264, CNN 
Talk Back Live, Nov. 1, 1995 available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, Transcripts file (histo-
rian Doris Kearns Goodwin commenting that novelty lies not in Hillary Rodham 
Clinton's exercising power, but in her visibility). 
Hillary Rodham Clinton also brought with her substantial qualifications for public 
office in any administration. She served on the board of the Legal Services Corporation, 
as well as Wal-Mart and TCBY, and was named as one of the hundred most influential 
attorneys in the United States. She has also written articles on the legal treatment of 
children and worked on education standards in Arkansas. See Lewis L. Gould, Hillary 
Rodham Clinton 630-50 in Lewis L. Gould, ed., American First Ladies 630-50 (Garland 
Publishing, 1996); see also Richard P. Wulwick and Frank J. Macchiarola, Congressional 
Interference with the President's Power to Appoint, 24 Stetson L. Rev. 625, 650 n.122 (re-
viewing Hillary Rodham Clinton's accomplishments and concluding that she is qualified 
to be attorney general). 
89. Criticism of Hillary Rodham Clinton's influence on the ground that she is nei-
ther elected nor officially appointed thus ignores the important role long played by such 
informal presidential advisers. See Gary Wills, A Doll's House?, New York Rev. Books 
6, 9-10 (Oct. 22, 1992); Anna Quindlan, The (New) Hillary Problem, N.Y. Times§ 4 at 17 
(Nov. 8, 1992). 
90. Questions of the boundaries between formal and informal advisers have arisen 
in other contexts as well. In 1977, the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel ad-
dressed the issue whether conflict-of-interest statutes applied to someone not on the gov-
ernment payroll who "advises the President almost daily, principally on an informal ba-
sis." 1 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 20 (1977). The Office of Legal Counsel concluded that 
such a person was not an employee for conflict-of-interest purposes. Id. However, when 
the person undertook additional work on a "current social issue," which involved coordi-
nating governmental activities and chairing meetings attended by government employ-
ees, the opinion concluded that the person should be deemed a government official. Id. 
Being a government official would seem to be a necessary, though perhaps not a suf-
ficient condition for impeachability. See notes 61-65 and accompanying text (discussing 
distinction between "official" and "officer"). 
91. The discussion of the legal position of the First Spouse helps to demonstrate 
how the First Spouse differs categorically from other nominal "firsts" associated with the 
presidency. By analogy to the First Spouse, commentators may refer to Roger Clinton as 
the "first brother," see, e.g., Tony Allen-Mills, Oh Brother, It's That Roger Clinton 
Again, Sunday Times 19 (Mar. 16, 1997), to Chelsea Clinton as the "first daughter," see, 
e.g., Ann Gerhart and Annie Groer, Chelsea Clinton, Neat Sixteen, Wash. Post C1 (Aug. 
29, 1996), and even to Socks as the "First Cat," see, e.g., Bill Locey, Outings; Animal At-
traction; Tippi Hedren's Acton Preserve Provides A Haven for Abandoned Big Cats and 
Other Game, L.A. Times F34, F35 (June 19, 1997), and to Buddy as the "first dog," see, 
e.g., Elizabeth Shogren, Clinton 'Inclination' Excludes Little Buddys From First Dog, 
L.A. Times AS (March 11, 1998); see also Roy Rowan and Brooks 1 an is, First Dogs: 
American Presidents and Their Best Friends 144 (Algonquin Books of Chapel Hill, 1997). 
No other relationship, though, rivals that of the First Spouse in the level of significant 
public functions. Children, brothers, and sisters may undertake particular official duties, 
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1. First Spouse as Close Adviser 
In view of the increasingly open policy role of the First 
Spouse and the increasing concern with regularizing governmen-
tal power, it was inevitable that a court would be called upon to 
define the role of the First Spouse. That moment came in a 
challenge under F ACA. F ACA requires that the meetings of a 
federal advisory committee, along with its records and reports, 
be open to the public.92 The statute defines "advisory commit-
tee" broadly to include any group "established or utilized" by 
the President or an agency "in the interest of obtaining advice or 
recommendations."93 However, the Act exempts from its re-
quirements any committee "composed wholly of full-time offi-
cers or employees of the Federal Government."94 Groups seek-
ing access to the deliberations of the President's Task Force on 
National Health Care Reform argued that the Task Force was an 
advisory committee subject to FACA's regulations. The groups 
asserted that the governmental committee exemption could not 
apply to the Task Force because of the membership of Hillary 
Rodham Clinton. They insisted that she was not an "officer or 
employee" of the Federal Government. 
The district court agreed with the plaintiffs' construction of 
the statute.95 The court interpreted FACA by reference to other 
sections of Title 5 of the United States Code, which provided 
definitions of the terms "officer" and "employee." These sec-
tions defined an "officer" as a person "required by law to be ap-
pointed in the civil service"96 and an "employee" as an individual 
"appointed in the civil service. "97 Because Hillary Rodham 
Clinton was not appointed in the civil service or required to be 
appointed in the civil service, the court concluded that she fell 
outside the statutory definition of officer or employee.98 The 
court also noted the absence of other indicia of employment, 
but they never assume the full panoply of ceremonial and administrative functions that 
help to define the First Spouse as a public officer. See also Federal Yellow Book,§ I at 1-
1 to 1-13 (Leadership Directories, Winter 1995) (including listing for Hillary Rodham 
Clinton and for Office of the First Lady, but no entry for Chelsea Clinton, Roger Clinton, 
or Socks). 
92. 5 U.S.C. App., §§ 10(a)(1), 10(c) (1994). 
93. Id. § 3(2). 
94. ld. 
95. Ass'n of American Physicians and Surgeons v. Clinton, 813 F. Supp. 82 (D.D.C. 
1993). 
96. 5 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(l) (1994). 
97. Id. § 2105(a)(1). 
98. 813 F. Supp. at 87. 
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such as the taking of an oath of office.99 Having held that F ACA, 
by its terms, did apply to the Task Force, the court went on to 
consider the effect ofF ACA on the President's ability to obtain 
candid advice. The court reasoned that access to the confiden-
tial deliberations of advisers was essential to enable Presidents 
to fulfill their Article II duties. 100 With regard to meetings at 
which the Task Force formulated recommendations for the 
President, the court found that the statute would frustrate the 
President's constitutional interest in obtaining confidential, 
hence candid, advice. Accordingly, as applied to such meetings, 
the court held F ACA an unconstitutional intrusion by Congress 
into the prerogatives of the Executive Branch. 101 
Like the district court, the court of appeals showed great 
concern with F ACA's potential for interfering with the Presi-
dent's ability to obtain candid advice. 102 The court of appeals 
sought to avoid the "difficult"103 constitutional issue by constru-
ing F ACA not to apply to the Task Force. While the court ac-
knowledged that Hillary Rodham Clinton did not fit within the 
definition of officer or employee in Title 5 of the United State 
Code, the court noted that another part of the Code that con-
tained a more expansive definition of an "officer" as "any gerson 
authorized by law to perform the duties of the office." 04 The 
court asserted that this definition might include someone not 
"formally" an officer, who was authorized to perform federal du-
ties.105 The court further relied on 3 U.S.C. § 105(e), the statutory 
authorization of aid to the President's spouse in connection with 
the spouse's assistance of the President. 106 This congressional ac-
knowledgment that the President might enlist the First Spouse in 
the discharge of the President's duties suggested that Congress 
intended the First Spouse to be treated as an "officer or em-
ployee" for purposes of the F ACA exemption. 107 By allowing 
public money to be used to assist the First Spouse in aiding the 
President, § 105( e) indicated that Congress viewed the First 
Spouse as a government "insider," rather than the sort of outside 
99. ld. 
100. Id. at 90-91. 
101. ld. at 93. The court upheld FACA as applied to other functions of the Task 
Force and enjoined further meetings until the FACA requirements were fulfilled. I d. 
102. Ass'n of American Physicians and Surgeons v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 910 (D.C. 
Cir. 1993). 
103. ld. 
104. I d. at 904 (quoting 1 U.S.C. § 1 ). 
105. ld. 
106. ld. (citing3 U.S.C. § 105(e)). 
107. ld. at 905. 
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interest whose influence on government F ACA was intended to 
regulate. 108 
The key to the court's analysis was its discussion of the seri-
ous constitutional issues that would arise from interpreting 
F ACA to apply to the Task Force. The court emphasized the 
President's need for confidential discussions with senior advis-
ers109 and noted that the President's spouse "typically, would be 
regarded as among those closest advisers."110 Although the court 
cast its opinion as merely applying the canon of construing stat-
utes to avoid difficult constitutional questions,111 the court 
strongly implied that the exemption for the First Spouse was 
constitutionally required. 112 Concurring in the judgment, Judge 
Buckley agreed that an exemption for the First Spouse was con-
stitutionally mandated. Like the district court, though, Judge 
Buckley concluded that the language of the statute did not ex-
empt the First Spouse. Accordingly, he asserted that F ACA was 
unconstitutional as applied to the Task Force. 113 
While ostensibly raising an issue of statutory construction, 
then, American Physicians was essentially a case about the con-
stitutional position of the First Spouse. 114 Although they followed 
108. See JayS. Bybee, Advising the President: Separation of Powers and the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act, 104 Yale L.J. 51, 112-13 (1994); Richard 0. Levine, The Federal 
Advisory Committee Act, 10 Harv. J. on Legis. 217, 225 (1973) (discussing background 
and purposes of FACA); Andrea L. Wolff, Comment, The Federal Ad~·isory Committee 
Act and the Executi~·e Pri~·ilege: Resolving the Separation of Powers Issue, 5 Seton Hall 
Const. L.J. 1023, 1027-28 (1995) (same). 
109. 997 F.2d at 909-10. 
110. !d. at 910. 
111. !d. at 910-11. 
112. Cf. id. at 910 (discussing situations in which FOIA exemption may be constitu-
tionally required to protect President's powers). Under the court's analysis, the applica-
tion of FACA to the Task Force might raise serious constitutional issues even if some of 
its members were concededly private citizens, far removed from the President's inner 
circle. The functional importance of the First Spouse's position, however, clearly magni-
fied the potential intrusion into the President's protected sphere: 
A statute interfering with a President's ability to seek advice directly from pri-
vate citizens as a group, intermixed, or not, with government officials, therefore 
raises Article II concerns. This is all the more so when the sole ground for as-
serting that the statute applies is that the President's own spouse, a member of 
the Task Force, is not a government official. For if the President seeks advice 
from those closest to him, whether in or out of government, the President's 
spouse, typically, would be regarded as among those closest advisers. 
!d.; see also Bybee, 104 Yale L.J. at 122-28 (cited in note 108) (discussing arguments for 
FACA's unconstitutionality); cf Public Citizen v. United States Department of Justice, 
491 U.S. 440, 482-89 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that 
F ACA unconstitutional as applied to American Bar Association committee advising 
President on judicial nominations). 
113. 997 F.2d at 925 (Buckley, J., concurring in the judgment). 
114. See Bybee, 104 Yale L.J. at 95 (cited in note 108) (arguing that court "did not 
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somewhat different paths, all four judges who addressed the is-
sue concluded that for constitutional purposes, the spouse 
should be treated as a close adviser to the President and, ac-
cordingly, that the principle of separation of powers protected 
the First Spouse's consultations with the President and with 
other executive officials. 
The significance of the Court of Appeals' constitutional 
analysis should not, however, be overstated. The court seemed 
primarily concerned with protecting the President's cons_ulta-
tions with any advisers, whether in or out of government.''' To 
avoid the constitutional question, the court happily reached out 
for the statutory exemption for committees composed entirely of 
government officials. The desire to avoid the constitutional 
question clearly drove the court's analysis of the First Spouse. 
2. First Spouse as Confidential Agent 
In a subsequent case, involving the Independent Counsel's 
investigation of Whitewater, the question of the First Spouse's 
legal status arose in a context that did not involve a stretch to 
avoid constitutional questions. The Independent Counsel sub-
poenaed notes of conversations between Hillary Rodham 
Clinton and attorneys acting as Counsel to the President. Re-
sisting the subpoena, the White House and Hillary Rodham 
Clinton asserted that the conversations were shielded by the at-
torney-client privilege. A central issue in the dispute was 
whether the First Spouse was a White House official. Her offi-
cial status was an important premise of the argument that the 
White House Counsel represented her and that her conversa-
tions with White House lawyers were therefore privileged."" 
The district court recognized that this privilege issue arose 
in a context far removed from the interpretation of F ACA. 
Nevertheless, the court found that the holding in American Phy-
sicians could not be limited to that specific statutory setting. In 
view of the broad acknowledgment of the First Spouse's impor-
tant governmental role in American Physicians, the district court 
found that the First Spouse was a "de facto officer or employee 
avoid the constitutional question"). 
115. See note 112. 
116. See Ronald D. Rotunda, Lips Unlocked; Attorney-Client Privilege and the Gov-
ernment Lawyer, Legal Times 21, 28 (June 30, 1997) (criticizing privilege based on Hil-
lary Rodham Clinton's not being government official); Stuart Taylor, Jr., The President 
and the Privilege, Legal Times 27 (May 12, 1997) (asserting, in defense of privilege, that 
"every first lady functions as an official"). 
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of the White House."117 Although the majority in the court of 
appeals did not reach the question, reversing on other grounds, 
the dissenting judge agreed with the district court that the First 
Spouse's official status followed from American Physicians. 118 
Most recently, the question of the First Spouse's official po-
sition arose in the course of the Independent Counsel's investi-
gation of matters concerning Monica Lewinsky. White House 
officials refused to answer certain questions before a grand jury, 
citing executive privilege.119 The officials claimed that executive 
privilege extended to conversations with Hillary Rodham 
Clinton, and they, relied on American Physicians in support of 
their argument. 12 The district court agreed, citing American Phy-
sicians for the proposition that the First Spouse should be 
treated as "the functional equivalent of an assistant to the Presi-
dent. ,121 
3. The Running Mate 
The decisions in American Physicians and the two privilege 
cases recognize the close policy-making relationship between the 
President and the First Spouse. The contemporary First Spouse 
functions as a key policy adviser. Moreover, this important role 
for the First Spouse is widely recognized by the public and dis-
cussed during presidential elections. During their first campaign 
for the White House, Bill Clinton and Hillary Rodham Clinton 
emphasized their shared qualifications and their close working 
relationship. Comments such as "Bu~ one, get one free" and 
"It's a two-for-one, blue plate special"1 2 stressed the couple's in-
tended political partnership. In the 1996 presidential race, both 
117. Office of the President v. Office of Independent Counsel, petition for cert., 96-
1783, 71a (reprinting In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum to the White House (E.D. 
Ark. Nov. 26, 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. 
Ct. 2482 (1997)). 
118. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
(Kopf, J., dissenting); see also Martha Ezzard, First Lady an Easier Target, Atlanta Con-
stitution SA (May 19, 1997) (arguing in support of privilege that "[p)rior cases make it 
clear the first lady is an 'official"'). 
119. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d 21, 27 (D.D.C. 1998). 
120. ld. 
121. !d. (quoting Ass'n of American Physicians v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 904 (D.C. 
Cir. 1993)) (internal quotations omitted). Although finding that executive privilege cov-
ered conversations involving Hillary Rodham Clinton, the district court nevertheless 
granted the Independent Counsel's motion to compel the testimony. The court con-
cluded that the Independent Counsel had shown sufficient need to overcome the privi-
lege. !d. at 29. 
122. Kate Muir, All Things to All America, Times (London) 4 (Jan. 19, 1993) (quot-
ing Bill Clinton and Hillary Rodham Clinton) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Hillary Rodham Clinton and Elizabeth Hanford Dole played 
very public roles, including giving major speeches at the nomi-
nating conventions. Some commentators even proposed that, in 
light of the important position of the First Spouse, the two 
should have a formal debate. 123 The electorate knew what kind of 
policy roles the prospective First Spouses would play and could 
vote accordingly. Indeed, the views of the First Spouses and 
their likely roles in the administration are much better known to 
the voters than are the opinions, or even the identities, of other 
pros~ective executive officials, including possible cabinet mem-
bers. 24 The electoral system thus has acknowledged and accom-
modated the official position of the First Spouse. The "First 
Team" does enjoy a kind of electoral mandate, conferring a 
democratic imprimatur on the First Spouse's official activities. 
4. Summary 
The opinions in American Physicians and the two privilege 
cases give rise to two important principles. First, it is clear that 
although American Physicians arose in a narrow statutory con-
text, its implications cannot be so limited. The driving force be-
hind the majority opinion was its understanding of the First 
Spouse's place within the constitutional framework of the Presi-
dency. For the majority, the First Spouse functioned as a senior 
presidential aide, whose confidential advisory role required con-
stitutional protection from even congressionally authorized in-
trusion. The district court opinions in the privilege cases con-
firmed the expansive nature of the majority's reasoning. Those 
rulings applied the tenet that American Physicians established: 
The First Spouse enjoys an official position in the executive 
branch, independent of any particular statutory framework. 
Second, the cases make clear that important issues of privilege 
may turn on the question of the First Spouse's position. Relying 
at least in part on the First Spouse's official position, American 
Physicians effectively cloaked the First Spouse with a kind of ex-
ecutive privilege. The district court supervising the Monica 
Lewinsky grand jury made that implication explicit by holding 
123. See, e.g., Francis L. Loewenheim, Why Not a (Hillary) Clinton vs. (Liddy) Dole 
Debate?, Houston Chron. A4 (Sept. 1, 1996); Caroline Schomp, Let Hillary and Liddy 
Debate, Denver Post liB (Oct. 11, 1996). 
124. See Sanford Levinson, Presidential Elections and Constitutional Stupidities, 12 
Const. Comm. 183, 185 (1995) (criticizing "pernicious practice of candidates feeling no 
need whatsoever to identify anyone who would occupy high positions in their administra-
tions"). 
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that executive privilege extends to the First Spouse. In the 
Whitewater case, the district court similarly included the First 
Spouse within the White House for purposes of the attorney-
client privilege. 
By recognizing the First Spouse's important duties, these 
court decisions provide support for including the First Spouse 
within a functional understanding of the Impeachment Clause. 
If the purpose of impeachment is to allow Congress to exercise a 
check over powerful officials in the executive branch, then in-
cluding the First Spouse within the scope of impeachable offi-
cials furthers this purpose. More specifically, these decisions 
emphasize that with the First Spouse's official status comes a 
panoply of non-statutory privileges shielding the First Spouse's 
conduct from congressional and judicial scrutiny. The privileges 
afforded to members of the executive branch suggest that im-
peachment may be a necessary check on those who fall within 
this protected sphere. Membership has its privileges, but also its 
responsibilities, and impeachment allows Congress to police mis-
conduct by those enjoying the privileges. 125 
Of course, if government abuse is the target, impeachment 
could be part of the problem, rather than part of the solution. 
Unscrupulous politicians have abused the impeachment process 
in the past to advance partisan political goals. 126 The impeach-
ment trials of Justice Samuel Chase and President Andrew John-
son arguably threatened, rather than advanced, important prin-
ciples of separation of powers.127 The movements to impeach 
Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice William Douglas also ex-
posed the potential of impeachment to undermine the independ-
ence of the judiciary. 128 The possibility of impeaching the First 
125. An alternative approach would simply assert that the courts erred in finding the 
First Spouse to be a government official. The decision in American Physicians has re· 
ceived scholarly criticism. See Anessa Abrams, The First Lady: Federal Employee or 
Citizen·Representative Under FACA, 62 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 855 (1994); see also 
Wasserman, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 1215 (cited in note 18). 
126. See Potts, 12 St. Louis L. Rev. at 35·36 (cited in note 24) (noting that impeach-
ment process is "often subject to partisan prejudices"). 
127. See William H. Rehnquist, Grand Inquests 276-78 (William Morrow & Co., Inc., 
1992). 
128. See Stephen B. Burbank, Alternative Career Resolution: An Essay on the Re· 
moval of Federal Judges, 76 Ky. L. J. 643, 650 (1987/1988); see also Todd D. Peterson, 
The Role of the Executive Branch in the Discipline and Removal of Federal Judges, 1993 
U. 111. L. Rev. 809,849 & n.210 (citing attempt to impeach Justice Douglas as among "the 
most overt threats to judicial independence"); Gordon Bermant and Russell R. Wheeler, 
Federal Judges and the Judicial Branch: Their Independence and Accountability, 46 Mer-
cer L. Rev. 835, 840 (1995) (noting that opponents of Chief Justice Warren and Justice 
Douglas were accused of "using impeachment to curtail independence"). 
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Spouse could certainly lend itself to such misuse. The likelihood 
that in the near future First Spouses will continue to be women 
presents another ground for caution. At least some criticism of 
Hillary Rodham Clinton reflects mere hostility to the notion of a 
powerful woman, and impeachment would provide an additional 
outlet for such pernicious sentiments. 129 As all power can be 
abused, the possibility of abuse does not dispose of arguments 
for the impeachment power. In analyzing impeachment from 
the functional perspective, though, it is relevant to consider 
whether in practical application impeachment is likely to further 
or to retard the proper functioning of the political system. The 
Constitution embodies a judgment that in general the need for 
subordinate officers to be removable by Congress is worth the 
risk of abuse of the impeachment process. In exploring how that 
principle applies to a particular extraordinary situation, it may 
well be worth an independent weighing of the need and the risks. 
III. IMPEACHMENT APPLIED TO FIRST SPOUSE 
What would it mean if the First Spouse were impeached and 
convicted? The political fallout would likely be great, but the 
practical consequences would be slight. The Constitution pro-
vides two punishments that impeachment may entail: removal 
from office and disqualification from holding future office. Im-
peachment would not entail divorce: the spouse would remain 
married to the President. Like other members of the President's 
family, the impeached spouse could continue to live at the White 
House. 130 At the other end of the spectrum, the impeached 
spouse could not be considered a government official for consti-
tutional purposes. 
To the extent that a constitutional privilege may shield 
communications among the President's advisers or between the 
advisers and the President, an impeached spouse would no 
longer fall under this protective mantle. Separation of powers 
12\1. See Faludi, The Power Laugh at 13 (cited in note R8); Quindlan, The (New) 
Hillary Problem, § 4 at 17 (cited in note 8\1); Anne Reifenberg and Kathy Lews, Mrs. 
Clinton's Defenders Call Attacks Sexist, Dallas Morning News lA (Mar. 12, 1994); Ruth 
Rosen, Editorial, Weak Men Hate Hillary Because She's Strong, Buff. News F\1 (Feb. 11, 
1996). 
130. President Franklin Roosevelt's unofficial adviser Harry Hopkins lived at the 
White House, see Naftali Bendavid, The First Lady and the Law, Legal Times I, 23 (Mar. 
15, 1\193), as did Jimmy Carter's adult son. See Lynn Smith, In the Spotlight at a Tender 
Age Chelsea Clinton Won't Find It Easy Being a Kid in the White House, K.C. Star Fl 
(Dec. 15, 1992). 
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might require that the executive enjoy a sphere of deliberation 
immune from investigative intrusion undertaken or authorized 
by other branches. However, impeachment gives Congress the 
power to determine which persons have abused the public trust 
and rendered themselves unsuitable for such participation in 
governance. These disabilities, though, would likely have little 
practical import. Impeachment would not remove all constitu-
tional protection from deliberations involving the spouse. Con-
sultations with private citizens might enhance the performance 
of the President's duties, and some have argued that such discus-
sions should enjoy a measure of executive privilege.131 The 
spouse's conversations with other policy makers also might fall 
under the privilege protecting the deliberative processes of gov-
ernment officials. 132 Along similar lines, communications be-
tween an impeached spouse and government lawyers could not 
be shielded by the attorney-client privilege based on the First 
Spouse's official position, but other privileges likely would apply; 
spousal privilege might protect communications directly with the 
President. 133 
Like many functions related to the President's position as 
head of state, an impeached spouse's ceremonial role would be 
governed more by rules of etiquette than by rules of law. As a 
matter of constitutional etiquette, it might be inappropriate for 
131. See Bybee, 104 Yale L.J. at 122-28 (cited in note 108). President Nixon, for ex-
ample, claimed executive privilege for conversations with John Mitchell at the time he 
headed Nixon's re-election campaign. However, a recent decision of the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit suggests limits to the scope of the privilege for 
presidential communications. See In reSealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 752 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
(asserting that "presidential communications privilege ... should not extend to staff out-
side the White House in executive branch agencies"); see also 26A Charles Alan Wright 
and Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure § 5673, at 49-50 (West 
Publishing, 1992) (discussing scope of executive privilege). For an overview of executive 
privilege and a review of arguments endorsing and opposing it, see Mark J. Rozell, Ex-
ecuth·e Privilege (Johns Hopkins U. Press, 1994). 
Courts have held that the Freedom of Information Act exemption for internal gov-
ernment communications extends to reports prepared by outside advisers. See Soucie v. 
David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1078 n.44 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Judge MacKinnon relied on this FOIA 
case law in asserting that executive privilege extends to communications with private citi-
zens. See Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 755 n.ll2 (D. C. Cir. 1973) (MacKinnon, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part). 
132. See Russell L. Weaver and James T.R. Jones, The Deliberative Process Privi-
lege, 54 Mo. L. Rev. 279 (1989) (discussing deliberative process privilege generally). 
133. The attorney-client privilege might be available based on theories, such as 
common interest, that do not depend on the government's lawyers serving as counsel for 
the spouse. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 922-23 (8th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2482 (1997) (discussing common interest doctrine). For a 
discussion of spousal privileges, see Christopher B. Mueller and Laird C. Kirkpatrick, 2 
Federal Evidence§§ 206,207, at 425-46 (Lawyers Cooperative Publishing, 2d. ed 1994). 
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the impeached spouse to represent the United States in official 
capacities: impeachment entails the judgment that a person has 
abused the public trust, and the people of the United States de-
serve a more fitting representative. 
Similarly, an impeached spouse should no longer enjoy the 
official assistance provided by 3 U.S.C. § 105(e). The statute 
authorizes aid for the First Spouse to enable the spouse to help 
the President perform official duties. As the impeached spouse 
would no longer provide such officially sanctioned assistance to 
the President, aid for the impeached spouse would not further 
h I~ t e statutory purpose. 
One consequence of impeachment that would have signifi-
cant legal import would be the disqualification provision, though 
it is of course highly speculative whether a First Spouse would 
seek any further office. 135 The application of the disqualification 
provision is relatively straightforward. Congress could- though 
need not136 -specify that the impeachment conviction includes a 
prohibition from holding office in the future. The Constitution 
134. The question then arises whether the President could replace the impeached 
spouse and thereby continue to receive the assistance formerly provided by the First 
Spouse. The language of§ 105(e) appears to preclude such a replacement. The statute 
grants the President power to designate a substitute First Spouse only if the President has 
no spouse. Because impeachment is not divorce, the impeached spouse remains married 
to the President, and the replacement provision does not apply. A less wooden reading 
of the statute, though, yields a contrary, and more reasonable, conclusion. The statute 
embodies congressional recognition that the President needs assistance of the kind usu-
ally provided by the First Spouse. Whether or not Congress wished to limit the Presi-
dent's discretion to replace the First Spouse unilaterally, impeachment represents a con-
gressional judgment of the spouse's unfitness. In such a circumstance, in which Congress 
both has recognized a need and found the usual assistant unfit, the statute could be read 
by implication to authorize assistance to a replacement designated by the President. 
135. Hillary Rodham Clinton certainly has the traditional qualifications for high 
government office. See, e.g., Wulwick and Macchiarola, 24 Stetson L. Rev. at 650 n.122 
(cited in note 88) (reviewing Hillary Rodham Clinton's accomplishments and concluding 
that she is qualified to be attorney general). A New Yorker article touched off a flurry of 
speculation about Hillary Rodham Clinton's presidential ambitions. See Connie Bruck, 
Hillary the Pol, New Yorker 58, 91-95 (May 30, 1994) (discussing possibility of Hillary 
Rodham Clinton's running for President). But see Hillary Clinton for President? New 
Yorker Article Brings Denials, Washington Post A9 (May 23, 1994). The other possible 
First Spouse in the 1996 election, Elizabeth Dole, also has strong credentials for high of-
fice, including prior service as Secretary of Labor and Secretary of Transportation. See 
Robert P. Sigman, The Doles' White House Banter Makes You Wonder, K.C. Star C7 
(Jan. 2, 1998). 
136. See Procedure and Guidelines for Impeachment Trials in the United States Sen-
ate (Revised Ed.), S. Doc. No. 33, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 95, 99, 101 (Government Printing 
Office, 1986). Alcee Hastings, for example, held office in the House of Representatives 
following his impeachment from a federal judgeship. See Waggoner v. Hastings, 816 F. 
Supp. 716,719 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (ruling that disqualification from office was not necessarv 
consequence of congressional impeachment). -
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permits Congress to make the judgment that a person who has 
once breached the public trust is unfit for any further govern-
ment service. 
In sum, the impeached spouse could act as an unofficial ad-
visor, but no more. Such an informal advisory role traditionally 
has been an important part of the First Spouse's position. Im-
peachment would not prevent the spouse from influencing the 
President's policies, editing the President's speeches, or engaging 
in political debates in the media, as former First Spouses have 
done. 137 By contrast, the more formal roles that recent First 
Spouses have assumed might well be prohibited to an impeached 
spouse. The propriety of attending cabinet meetings and of 
holding official talks with foreign leaders, for example, reflects 
the official position of the First Spouse. An impeached 
Rosalynn Carter could not have undertaken these responsibili-
ties. Nor could an impeached spouse serve as the official in 
charge of a government task force, unless the President formally 
appointed the spouse to the position, in the same manner as the 
President would appoint any other private citizen. 138 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The idea of impeaching the First Spouse may seem far-
fetched, but should seem no more odd than treating the First 
Spouse as a government officer. First Spouses have always 
played some role in a presidential administration, and the recent 
growth in the spouse's public advisory role will likely continue. 
This greater public visibility, along with increased concern about 
regulating the operations of government officials, has demanded 
a clarification of the First Spouse's position. Is the First Spouse 
an officer or merely a member of the kitchen cabinet? Influ-
enced by the functional importance of the position, recent court 
rulings confer official status on the First Spouse. These decisions 
raise various questions concerning how the First Spouse fits 
within other laws governing officials, such as the Anti-Nepotism 
Act139 and conflict-of-interest laws.140 Other questions include 
137. See text accompanying notes 80-87. 
138. If an impeached spouse is not disqualified from future office, the spouse could 
become a government officer and engage in all manner of official duties. The spou.se 
would, though, have to comply with relevant statutory reqUirements, such as the stnc-
tures of the Anti-Nepotism Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 3110 (1992). 
139. 5 u.s.c. § 3110 (1992). 
140. See, e.g., Wasserman, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 1250-59 (cited in note 18) (discussing 
how various statutory provisions should apply to First Spouse). 
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whether the First Spouse should take the constitutionally re-
quired oath. 
A more fundamental characteristic of an office is the man-
ner of removal. The means by which the public may assert con-
trol over its officers plays an important role in determining the 
level of government accountability. The nation is fortunate to 
have had very capable spouses to assist its Presidents. In view of 
the important advisory and ceremonial role of the First Spouse, 
it may make sense to treat the spouse as a federal officer. How-
ever, it would be an intolerably Imperial Presidency if marriage 
to the President made one not only an officer, but an unim-
peachable one. In this essay, we have explored what impeach-
ment would entail. Because the practical consequences would 
be slight and the perils of partisan politicking great, impeaching 
the First Spouse in any circumstances might be a very bad idea. 
Such pragmatic concerns may figure into a constitutional analy-
sis of the possibility of impeachment. 141 Our constitutional guar-
antees of government accountability, though, also must figure 
into the analysis. If impeachment is intolerable because of the 
high possibility of abuse, then perhaps, at a minimum, the courts 
should rethink the question of the First Spouse's official status. 
141. See Clinton v. Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636, 1651 (1997) (considering argument that 
possibility of ··politically motivated harassing and frivolous litigation"" justified constitu-
tional privilege for the President). 
